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State v. Hunt and Exculpatory DNA Evidence: When Is a
New Trial Warranted?
Scientific methods of personal identification play a large role in
criminal cases, and as new identification methods are perfected, the
nature of evidence presented at trials changes accordingly. For
example, in the late 1800s, the Bertillon method of human iden-
tification was widely used.' This method of identification took verbal
and physical characteristics into account, such as the diameter of the
head, the length of fingers, the manner of speech, and the color of the
iris of the left eye.' In the early 1900s, fingerprints were first used to
identify criminal suspects, and are still used in trials today. Another
scientific method currently used to identify criminal suspects is
forensic odontology, the study of dental marks.' The latest tech-
nological advance in human identification to have a significant impact
on our trial system is deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA, analysis.
1. G. Larry Mays et al., Review Essay: DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) Evidence,
Criminal Law, and Felony Prosecutions: Issues and Prospects, 16 JUST. SYs. J. 111, 112
(1992). Bertillon devised the first system of human identification that classified data in
such a way that it was possible to quickly find the required description. HENRY T.F.
RHODES, ALPHONSE BERTILLON: FATHER OF SCIENTIFIC DETECTION 91 (1956). The
principles of classification he formulated were used in some form by all of his successors.
Id.
2. Mays et al., supra note 1, at 112. The Bertillon method was used until the 1930s
when two individuals were found to have the same measurements. Id.
3. See id. at 113. William Herschel was the first person to use fingerprints for
identification purposes, and he did so from 1858 to 1878. GERALD LAMBOURNE, THE
FINGERPRINT STORY 21 (1984). However, fingerprinting was not used in a murder trial
until 1905. Id. at 73.
4. See State v. Thomas, 329 N.C. 423,427,407 S.E.2d 141,145 (1991); State v. Green,
305 N.C. 463, 470-71, 290 S.E.2d 625, 630 (1982); State v. Carter, 74 N.C. App. 437, 442,
328 S.E.2d 607, 610 (1985).
5. In 1985, Dr. Alec J. Jeffreys of Leicester University in England announced a new
technique to positively identify a person by a process he called "DNA Fingerprinting."
See Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable 'Minisatellite' Regions in Human DNA, 314
NATURE 67 (1985). The North Carolina Supreme Court described DNA in layman's terms
as follows:
DNA is the chemical which encodes all genetic information. DNA is located in
the nucleus of all nucleated cells in the human body, remains constant throughout
a person's life, and is identical in each cell .... [The DNA extracted from a
man's blood cells is identical to the DNA extracted from his sperm cells. Every
person's DNA is unique with the exception of identical twins.
State v. Pennington, 327 N.C. 89, 93,393 S.E.2d 847, 849-50 (1990). For a more technical
description of the nature of DNA, see BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES V (5th ed. 1994).
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DNA evidence, like its scientific predecessors,6 has the power not
only to incriminate defendants, but also to exculpate them.7
In State v. Hunt,8 the North Carolina Supreme Court faced for
the first time the question of whether newly discovered exculpatory
DNA evidence warrants a new trial.' Hunt is also noteworthy
because it was unusual in two respects. First, it involved exculpatory
DNA evidence in a felony-murder case, where the murder allegedly
occurred in the perpetration of four felonies, only one of which was
rape." Second, evidence suggested more than one perpetrator."
This Note addresses the Supreme Court's decision in Hunt, with
particular emphasis on the importance of exculpatory DNA evidence
in new trial jurisprudence. After reviewing the facts and conclusions
of the case," the Note examines the standard for granting new trials
on the basis of newly discovered evidence. 3 Next, the Note traces
6. DNA typing is not completely analogous to matching fingerprints to fingers. For
example, identical twins have different fingerprints, but the same DNA. PETER J.
RUSSELL, GENETICS 495 (4th ed. 1996); Norah Rudin, DNA Untwisted- Correcting Some
Misconceptions About Genetic Evidence, L.A. DAILY J., Apr. 20, 1995, at 6.
7. The inculpatory use of DNA evidence has been controversial because statistical
analysis is used to declare a DNA "match." See Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA
Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371 NATURE 735,735-39 (1994). For example, typical
testimony of an expert witness might be: Using a population base of white Americans, the
probability of finding a random match of the DNA found in the semen recovered from the
crime and in the defendant's blood was one in 27 million. See State v. Futrell, 112 N.C.
App. 651, 656, 436 S.E.2d 884, 886 (1993). However, "[o]ne aspect of DNA testing, an
exclusion, has never been at issue scientifically." V. Barry Scheck, The Use of DNA
Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, 23 HOFSTRA L. RV. 639, 639-40 (1995); see also Peter
Gill et al., Forensic Application of DNA 'Fingerprints', 318 NATURE 577, 578-79 (1985)
("[T]he condition of non-association has been absolute using traditional blood grouping
tests, that is, if the phenotype does not match, a common origin is not possible."). This
is because statistical analysis is not involved when declaring an exclusion; even one
discrepancy between two or more bar-code-like graphs that show the particular genetic
markers of the samples being compared is conclusive evidence that the samples do not
match. See People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995, 998 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); James C.
Hoeffel, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the
Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 526 (1990); Peter J. Neufeld, Have You No
Sense of Decency?, 84 J. C~iM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189, 191 (1993); David Wasserman &
Victor Walter Weedn, Forensic DNA Typing: Consensus and Controversy, in ABA
SECTION OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE REVIEW, MONOGRAPH
No. 1 at 31 (Bert Black & Marc S. Klein eds., 1993); Thomas D. Elias, DNA Test: How
Big a Doubt? State Supreme Court May Unravel Key Probability Issue, L.A. DAILY J.,
Aug. 9, 1995, at 6.
8. 339 N.C. 622, 457 S.E.2d 276 (1995).
9. See id. at 661, 457 S.E.2d at 299 (Frye, J., dissenting).
10. See id at 662, 457 S.E.2d at 299 (Frye, J., dissenting).
11. See id. at 632-33, 635-36, 457 S.E.2d at 282, 283-84.
12. See infra notes 18-59 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
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the short history of the use of DNA evidence in North Carolina 4
and examines the results other states have reached when presented
with exculpatory DNA evidence.' 5 The Note then examines Hunt
in light of other North Carolina DNA cases and compares North
Carolina's approach to that of other states. 6 Finally, it examines the
propriety of the decision and its probable impact on future criminal
defendants.'
In 1984, Darryl Hunt was indicted for the first-degree felony
murder of Deborah Sykes.' At his first trial, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty, but on appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court
ordered a new trial.' The Court found reversible error because the
content of a witness's statement was introduced through the testimony
of the police officer who took the statement.' In January 1990,
Sammy Mitchell was indicted as a codefendant,2' and later that year,
a jury found Darryl Hunt guilty at his second trial.2  Sammy
Mitchell was not tried with Hunt, and he had not been tried when
Hunt's second trial occurred23
The evidence produced in State v. Hunt did not present a clear
picture of the circumstances surrounding the crime. Deborah Sykes,
a white woman, was raped and murdered on her way to work
between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. on August 10, 1984.4 Several witnesses
saw the victim shortly before she was killed, and they gave conflicting
versions of the events. At the time in question, and in the general
vicinity of the crime scene, one woman said she saw two black men
walking together, and identified Darryl Hunt and Sammy Mitchell as
the two men.' Two other witnesses confirmed that two black men
were walking with a white woman; one said Hunt could have been the
one walking a step behind the other two,26 but the other said neither
14. See infra notes 67-78 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 79-140 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 141-77 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 141, 178-91 and accompanying text.
18. Hunt, 339 N.C. at 628, 457 S.E.2d at 279.
19. State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. 343, 354, 378 S.E.2d 754, 760 (1989).
20. Id at 348-49, 378 S.E.2d at 757. Instead, the prior statements should have been
admitted only to demonstrate that she made statements to the officer on a particular date.
d. at 352, 378 S.E.2d at 759.
21. Hunt, 339 N.C. at 644, 457 S.E.2d at 289.
22. 1d at 628, 457 S.E.2d at 279.
23. See id at 644, 457 S.E.2d at 289.
24. I at 628-31, 457 S.E.2d at 279-81.
25. Id at 632, 457 S.E.2d at 282.
26. See id. at 632-33, 457 S.E.2d at 282. The witness said that a man with "braided"
hair was walking a step behind, and other descriptions of the defendant indicated that he
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Hunt nor Mitchell were the men he saw.27 However, two other
witnesses said only one black man was walking with the woman, but
also did not identify Hunt.' Yet another witness identified Hunt as
a man standing next to a woman while another black man, Johnny
Gray, watched from the bushes.29 In addition, Johnny Gray said he
saw Hunt straddling and hitting a white woman who was naked from
the waist down, and then running away while tucking in his shirt."
Two witnesses testified about events that occurred after the
murder. Roger Weaver testified that a man he later identified as
Hunt came into the hotel where he worked and was in the restroom
for an unusually long time; when Weaver entered the restroom a
short time later, the sink was pink and there were bloody paper
towels in the trash' Margaret Marie Crawford testified that she
went out with Hunt, Mitchell, and another woman the night before
the crime and returned to her room alone, and that Hunt joined her
in the early morning hours.32 When she woke at 8:00 or 8:30 a.m.,
Hunt was not in the room, but when he returned, he had grass stains
on his pants, was nervous, and appeared to wash blood from his
hands? 3  She testified that Hunt later told her that Mitchell had
raped and killed Deborah Sykes, and that he and Mitchell were "just
trying to rob her" but "she got killed."'34 Furthermore, both
had braided hair. See id at 634, 457 S.E.2d at 282. The witness also testified that he was
not wearing his contact lenses when he observed the incident. Id. at 633, 457 S.E.2d at
282.
27. Id at 636, 457 S.E.2d at 284.
28. Id. at 633, 457 S.E.2d at 282.
29. Id. at 634, 457 S.E.2d at 282-83. Another witness testified that he had known
Mitchell for 15 years and that he saw Mitchell walking very fast from a driveway near the
crime scene. Id. at 633-34, 457 S.E.2d at 282.
30. Id. at 634-35, 457 S.E.2d at 283. Gray called the police at 6:53 a.m. the day of the
murder, identified himself as Sammy Mitchell, and said he wanted to report a man beating
a woman. Id. at 634,457 S.E.2d at 283. When he was questioned about the murder three
days later, he told the police he knew nothing about it. Id. at 634-35, 457 S.E.2d at 283.
Eventually, he identified himself as the 911 caller, and he positively identified Terry
Thomas, a man who was in jail at the time of the murder, as the assailant. Id. Then Gray
viewed a lineup and wrote down the numbers "one" and "four." Id at 635,457 S.E.2d at
283. Darryl Hunt was wearing number "four." See id
31. Id. at 631-32,457 S.E.2d at 281. Weaver viewed the lineup nine months after the
murder. Id. at 648, 457 S.E.2d at 291. Weaver's in-court identification of Hunt was the
basis for one of the 14 assignments of error. See id. at 646-49, 457 S.E.2d at 290-92.
32. Id at 635, 457 S.E.2d at 283. Margaret Crawford was a fourteen-year-old
prostitute when the murder occurred. Id. The introduction of her statements at the first
trial was the basis for reversal. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
33. Hunt, 339 N.C. at 635, 457 S.E.2d at 283.
34. Id at 635-36, 457 S.E.2d at 284.
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Mitchell's and Hunt's alibi testimony from the first trial were
introduced."
At his second trial, Darryl Hunt was convicted and sentenced to
life imprisonment 6 for the first-degree felony murder 7 of Deborah
Sykes on the basis of murder during the commission of four felonies:
rape,'" sexual assault,39  kidnapping,' and robbery with a
dangerous weapon.4' By a vote of four to three,42 the North
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, denying Hunt's
Motion for Appropriate Relief4' and overruling all thirteen as-
signments of error.' On the basis of newly discovered DNA
evidence, the Motion for Appropriate Relief included a request to
dismiss the charges against Hunt or, in the alternative, to grant him
a new trial.45 Although the court devoted over twenty-three pages
to the thirteen assignments of error unanimously decided, the majority
dedicated only one page to the Motion for Appropriate Relief.46
Without mentioning its content, the majority merely adopted the
35. Id. at 636, 644, 457 S.E.2d at 284, 289. Defendant assigned error to the
introduction of both men's testimony from the first trial. Id. at 636-40, 644-45, 457 S.E.2d
at 284-86,289-90. During Hunt's second trial, Mitchell invoked his Fifth Amendment right
not to testify. Id. at 644, 457 S.E.2d at 289.
36. Hunt, 339 N.C. at 628, 457 S.E.2d at 279.
37. "A murder .. . which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of any arson, rape, or sexual offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other
felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be
murder in the first degree." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
38. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
39. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
40. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1993).
41. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (1993). Hunt, 339 N.C. at 662, 457 S.E.2d at 299
(Frye, I., dissenting). The robbery charge was based upon evidence that the victim was
carrying two to three hundred dollars, and that an empty pocketbook was found lying near
her body. Id.
42. Justices Mitchell, Whichard and Parker joined Justice Meyer's opinion. Justice
Frye wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Exum and Justice Webb joined.
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1411 (1988).
44. Hunt, 339 N.C. at 660-61, 457 S.E.2d at 298-99. The dissent agreed with the
majority concerning the 13 assignments of error, but would have granted the Motion for
Appropriate Relief. Id. at 661, 457 S.E.2d at 299. Thus, the bulk of the opinion was
unanimous.
45. The Motion for Appropriate Relief was supplemented several times, and covered
many issues. See id. at 660-61, 457 S.E.2d at 298; State v. Hunt, No. 84CRS42263, jud.
order (Super. Ct. Forsyth County, Aug. 12, 1994). However, the exculpatory DNA
evidence was discovered after the order of August 12, 1994, and was the only issue
analyzed in Judge Morgan's order of November 10, 1994. See State v. Hunt, No.
84CRS42263, jud. order (Super. Ct. Forsyth County, Nov. 4, 1994).
46. See Hunt, 339 N.C. at 636-61, 457 S.E.2d at 284-300.
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findings of fact and conclusions of law of Superior Court Judge
Morgan's orders denying Hunt's Motion for Appropriate Relief.47
Judge Morgan denied Hunt's Motion for Appropriate Relief after
a hearing in which a DNA expert testified that the semen found in
Deborah Sykes could not have come from Hunt, Mitchell, Johnny
Gray, or Sykes's husband Judge Morgan concluded that Hunt was
not entitled to a new trial because the new evidence probably would
not lead to a different result in a third trial.49 Judge Morgan based
his decision on several factors. First, he reasoned that there was
evidence that Hunt was the person who committed the murder in the
course of kidnapping and burglary, which would be unchanged in a
third trial.50 Next, there was also evidence that Hunt committed the
murder in the course of rape or sexual offense, which was not refuted
by the DNA evidence, because he could have penetrated the victim
without depositing semen.5 Furthermore, there was evidence that
Hunt either was one of two people who killed the victim, or that he
aided and abetted or acted in concert with the killer: He was seen
flailing the victim and there was blood on his hands and clothes. 2
Judge Morgan also explained that the State's case was not focused
entirely on the rape aspects of the crime, but was also focused on
disproving Hunt's alibi.53 Nevertheless, Judge Morgan did ack-
nowledge that the DNA evidence would most directly contradict the
prosecutor's statement regarding the victim's state of mind during
47. Id. at 660-61, 457 S.E.2d at 299.
48. State v. Hunt, No. 84CRS42263,jud. order at 4,9 (Super. Ct. Forsyth County, Nov.
10, 1994).
49. Id. at 10.
50. Id. at 5-6.
51. Id at 5-6, 8.
52. Id at 6. If Hunt aided or abetted the killer, he would still be guilty. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-5.2 (1993 & Supp. 1995) (stating that an accessory before the fact is
punishable as a principal felon); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-87(a) (1993) (stating that a person
who aids or abets a robbery is guilty of a Class D felony). An aider and abettor is
a person who is actually or constructively present at the scene of the crime and
who aids, advises, counsels, instigates or encourages another to commit the
offense ... if he shares the criminal intent of the perpetrator and if, during the
commission of the crime, he is in a position to render any necessary aid to
perpetrator.
State v. Barnette, 304 N.C. 447, 458, 284 S.E.2d 298, 305 (1981).
53. Hunt, No. 84CRS42263, jud. order at 9 (Super. Ct. Forsyth County, Nov. 10, 1994).
Judge Morgan also commented that the State's case was not focused on depositing sperm.
Id. He examined the prosecutor's closing argument and noted that while the prosecutor
referred to Hunt as a rapist six times, the argument also alluded to kidnapping, robbery,




Hunt's alleged rape of her.'4 Even so, Judge Morgan concluded that
the State's case was not "fatally flawed" because the State's theory on
rape and sexual offense was only "somewhat weakened" by the DNA
evidence."
The dissent disagreed with Morgan's conclusion that the DNA
evidence would probably not provide a different result at a third
trial.56  The dissent noted the State's theory was that the murder
occurred in the perpetration of four felonies, including rape, and that
the defendant's defense was alibi. 7  The dissent accordingly
concluded that the exculpatory DNA report was "powerful evidence
tending to weaken the State's entire case and strengthen the
defendant's defense."58 Consequently, the three dissenting justices
would have granted the Motion for Appropriate Relief by granting
Hunt a third trial.5
9
In North Carolina, the well-established prerequisites for a new
trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence are: (1) that the
witness or witnesses will give newly discovered evidence; (2) that such
newly discovered evidence is probably true; (3) that it is competent,
material, and relevant; (4) that due diligence was used and proper
means were employed to procure the evidence at trial; (5) that the
newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative; (6) that it does
not tend only to contradict a former witness or to impeach or
discredit him; and (7) that it is of such a nature as to show that on
another trial a different result will probably be reached and that the
right will prevail.' ° The test is a modification of the "Berry rule"
61
54. The prosecutor stated in his closing argument, "[W]hat was [the victim] thinking
when [this man right over here] spread those legs right there apart and he crawled down
inside her and he raped and ravaged her and deposited some sickening yellow fluids in her
body." Id. at 8-9, quoted in Hunt, 339 N.C. at 662,457 S.E.2d at 299 (Frye, J., dissenting).
55. State v. Hunt, No. 84CRS42263, jud. order at 10 (Super. Ct. Forsyth County, Nov.
10, 1994).
56. Hunt, 339 N.C. at 661, 457 S.E.2d at 299 (Frye, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 662, 457 S.E.2d at 299 (Frye, J., dissenting).
58. Id at 663, 457 S.E.2d at 300 (Frye, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Frye, J. dissenting).
60. See, e.g., State v. Britt, 320 N.C. 705, 712-13, 360 S.E.2d 660, 664 (1987); State v.
Nickerson, 320 N.C. 603,609-10,359 S.E.2d 760,763-64 (1987); State v. Gappins, 320 N.C.
64, 75, 357 S.E.2d 654, 661 (1987); State v. Person, 298 N.C. 765, 770-71, 259 S.E.2d 867,
870 (1979); State v. Beaver, 291 N.C. 137, 143, 229 S.E.2d 179, 183 (1976); State v. Casey,
201 N.C. 620, 624-25, 161 S.E. 81, 83-84 (1931); State v. Hoots, 76 N.C. App. 616, 618, 334
S.E.2d 74, 75-76 (1985); State v. Heath, 25 N.C. App. 71, 73, 212 S.E.2d 400, 402 (1975).
61. Britt, 320 N.C. at 713, 360 S.E.2d at 664. The rule is similar to that stated by the
Georgia Supreme Court more than a century ago. See Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 527
(1851). In Berry, the defendant was convicted for larceny and sought a new trial on
several grounds, including newly discovered evidence. Id. at 513-16. The court denied
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which is used in most jurisdictions.62 It is essentially the same as the
Berry rule, but adds the requirement that the new evidence must
probably be true.63 Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged in North
Carolina that a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly dis-
covered evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge and is not subject to reversal absent a showing of an abuse of
discretion.64 Moreover, motions for new trials are generally dis-
favored,65 but they are rarely denied on the sole ground that the new
evidence will probably not result in a different verdict.66
the new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence because the defendant may have
known about the evidence before his trial, the evidence would be inadmissible, and even
if admissible, it "would not weigh a feather." Id. at 528.
62. 58 AM. JUR. 2D New Trial § 415 (1989); Sharon Cobb, Comment, Gary Dotson as
Victim: The Legal Response to Recanting Testimony, 35 EMORY L.J. 969, 973-75 (1986).
63. Britt, 320 N.C. at 713, 360 S.E.2d at 664. North Carolina General Statute § 15A-
1415(b)(6) (1988 & Supp. 1995), which lists the grounds for appropriate relief, substantially
codifies the seven point test for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.
State v. Powell, 321 N.C. 364, 371, 364 S.E.2d 332, 336, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 830 (1988).
64. See, e.g., State v. Wiggins, 334 N.C. 18, 38, 431 S.E.2d 755, 767 (1993); State v.
Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 75, 357 S.E.2d 654, 661 (1987); State v. Beaver, 291 N.C. 137, 143,
229 S.E.2d 179, 183 (1976); State v. Williams, 244 N.C. 459,462,94 S.E.2d 374,376 (1956);
State v. Newell, 82 N.C. App. 707, 710, 348 S.E.2d 158, 161 (1986); State v. Sprinkle, 46
N.C. App. 802, 805, 266 S.E.2d 375, 377, disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 561, 270 S.E.2d 115
(1980); State v. Shelton, 21 N.C. App. 662, 664, 205 S.E.2d 316, 318, disc. rev. denied, 285
N.C. 667, 207 S.E.2d 760 (1974).
65. See Locklear v. Snow, 5 N.C. App. 434, 437-38, 168 S.E.2d 445, 448 (1969).
Furthermore, "[a]pplications of this kind. . . should be carefully scrutinized and cautiously
examined, and the burden is upon the applicant to rebut the presumption that the verdict
is correct and that there has been a lack of due diligence." Johnson v. Seaboard Airline
Ry. Co., 163 N.C. 431, 453, 79 S.E. 690, 699 (1913).
66. See Gappins, 320 N.C. at 76-77, 357 S.E.2d at 662 (upholding decision to deny a
new trial because new evidence that murder defendant was suffering from Vietnam War
Syndrome was not probably true, was merely cumulative, and would probably not lead to
a different result); Branch v. Seitz, 262 N.C. 727, 729-30, 138 S.E.2d 493, 495 (1964)
(denying new trial because new affidavits tended to corroborate plaintiff's testimony,
contradict defendant, and would probably not lead to a different result); Moore v. Superior
Stone Co., 251 N.C. 69, 71-72, 110 S.E.2d 459, 462-63 (1959) (holding that plaintiff failed
to show that there was newly discovered evidence and that there was no showing that a
different result would be reached at a new trial); State v. Clark, 65 N.C. App. 286,292-93,
308 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1983) (holding that new evidence of bullet hole in murder case did
not warrant a new trial because it was not procured with due diligence, was corroborative,
and would not lead to a different result), disc. rev. denied, 310 N.C. 627, 315 S.E.2d 693
(1984); State v. Heath, 25 N.C. App. 71, 73-74,212 S.E.2d 400, 401-02 (1975) (holding that
new evidence that codefendant stated in open court that Heath did not participate in
robbery would only contradict witnesses and would not cause a different result); see also
Powell, 321 N.C. at 370-71, 364 S.E.2d at 336 (upholding lower court's decision to deny
new trial because the defendant did not seek witness with due diligence); State v. Sauls,
291 N.C. 253, 262, 230 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1976) (holding that new evidence of a lie detector
test would not entitle defendant to a new trial because the evidence was not competent),
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The North Carolina Supreme Court first ruled on the general
admissibility of DNA evidence in 1990, in State v. Pennington.67 The
Pennington court ruled that DNA proffile testing is admissible because
the method is considered reliable within the scientific community and
uses established scientific techniques;68 however, the court noted that
DNA evidence may still be excluded by traditional evidentiary
challenges such as relevancy, prejudice, and chain of custody.69
Since Pennington, DNA evidence has been used in several types
of cases in North Carolina. As in Pennington, DNA evidence has
been used most often in cases where a rape occurred,0 but it has
also been used in murder cases,71 to establish paternity,72 to es-
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916 (1977).
67. 327 N.C. 89, 393 S.E.2d 847 (1990).
68. Id. at 99-100, 393 S.E.2d at 853. The court refused to adhere exclusively to the
formula established in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923), that the method of proof
must be generally accepted in the scientific community. Pennington, 327 N.C. at 98, 393
S.E.2d at 852. The court reasoned that the inquiry underlying the Frye theory is the
reliability of the scientific method, not its popularity. Id at 98, 393 S.E.2d at 852-53.
Therefore, the court
focused on the following indices of reliability: the expert's use of established
techniques, the expert's professional background in the field, the use of visual
aids before the jury so that the jury is not asked "to sacrifice its independence by
accepting [the] scientific hypotheses on faith," and independent research
conducted by the expert.
AL, 393 S.E.2d at 853 (quoting State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 150-51, 322 S.E.2d 370, 382
(1984)).
69. Pennington, 327 N.C. at 100-01, 393 S.E.2d at 854. Pennington involved a type of
DNA analysis called restriction fragment length polymorphism, or RFLP. Id. at 94, 393
S.E.2d at 850. For a detailed description of the RFLP process, see id at 94-95, 393 S.E.2d
at 850; PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18-3
(A), § 18-3 (B) (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 1995); LEWIN, supra note 5, at 134-41; Hoeffel, supra
note 7, at 472-74. The court summarized the testimony of one expert witness in
Pennington as "a different DNA analysis technique, the polymer chain reaction test...
would obtain results 'less equivocal' than those obtained in the present case." 327 N.C.
at 99,393 S.E.2d at 853. In Hunt, the polymer chain reaction (PCR) type of DNA analysis
was used. See Hunt, 339 N.C. at 661-63, 457 S.E.2d at 299-300 (Frye, J., dissenting).
Unlike RFLP analysis, PCR analysis can be performed on very old, not well-preserved
samples, and the testing requires only a minute quantity because the process involves
"amplification" of the sample. See Carmela F. Simoncini, DNA for the Defense, 52 GUILD
PRAc. 22, 24 (1995). For a more detailed account of the PCR, or allele-specific probe,
analysis process, see GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra, at § 18-3 (C); LEWIN, supra note
5, at 645-47; Hoeffel, supra note 7, at 474-75.
70. See, ag., State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1, 21, 449 S.E.2d 412, 425 (1994); State v.
Moseley, 336 N.C. 710, 718, 445 S.E.2d 906, 911 (1994); State v. Easterling, 119 N.C. App.
22,32,457 S.E.2d 913,919 (1995); State v. Hill, 116 N.C. App. 573,577-78,449 S.E.2d 573,
576 (1994); State v. Futrell, 112 N.C. App. 651, 656, 436 S.E.2d. 884, 886 (1993); State v.
Bruno, 108 N.C. App. 401, 406-07, 424 S.E.2d 440, 443-44 (1993).
71. State v. Chapman, No. 569A94, 1995 WL 723362, at *1 (N.C. Dec. 8, 1995); State
v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 486, 461 S.E.2d 664, 671 (1995); State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488,
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tablish an intestate successor,73 and to establish guilt in a criminal
conversation case.74 The North Carolina Court of Appeals has also
held that a defendant's right to a speedy trial was not infringed when
the reason for the delay was the State's attempt to have DNA tests
performed.'
The exculpatory use of DNA evidence in North Carolina recently
gained nationwide publicity when Ronald Cotton, who had been
convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment, was released
after serving nearly eleven years in jail.76 DNA tests showed that
Cotton was not the source of semen found in the victim. 77 After
Cotton's release, the true rapist confessed, stating, "I reckoned it
would come up sooner or later., 78
Ronald Cotton's story is not unique. Across the country,
numerous men have been released from prison on the basis of new
exclusionary DNA evidence.79 In fact, Barry Scheck and Peter
501-02,459 S.E.2d 747, 752-53 (1995); State v. Mills, 332 N.C. 392, 398-99, 420 S.E.2d 114,
116 (1992); see also State v. Carter, 338 N.C. 569, 580, 451 S.E.2d 157, 162-63 (1994)
(mentioning that DNA tests in case were inconclusive).
72. Johnson v. Meehan, 461 S.E.2d 369,370 (N.C. 1995); Tucker v. Clinton, 463 S.E.2d
806, 808 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); Brooks v. Hayes, 113 N.C. App. 168, 169, 438 S.E.2d 420-
21, 420 (1993); Surles v. Surles, 113 N.C. App. 32, 37, 437 S.E.2d 661, 664 (1993).
73. Batcheldor v. Boyd, 119 N.C. App. 204, 207-08, 458 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1995).
74. McLean v. Mechanic, 116 N.C. App. 271, 274, 447 S.E.2d 459, 460-61 (1994).
75. State v. McClain, 112 N.C. App. 208, 213-14, 435 S.E.2d 371, 373-74 (1993). The
trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the grounds that the defendant's right to a
speedy trial had been violated and the court of appeals held that the trial court committed
no error. Ild.
76. See DNA Clears a Man Convicted of Rapes, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at 22
[hereinafter DNA Clears Man]; James Thorner, Confession Brings End to Rape Case,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., July 12, 1995, at B2. For the procedural history of this case,
see State v. Cotton, 329 N.C. 764, 764-65, 407 S.E.2d 514, 515-16 (1991).
77. DNA Clears Man, supra note 76, at 22; Thomer, supra note 76, at B2.
78. Thorner, supra note 76, at B2.
79. See, eg., Peter Baker, Wrongly Imprisoned Va. Man Is Freed. Allen Grants
Pardon in '84 Rape Case, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 1994, at BI (reporting that Edward
Honaker was released due to exculpatory DNA evidence after nine years in jail); Sharon
Cohen, Dream Leads to Prison Term Until DNA Evidence Frees Him, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1994, at Al (reporting on Steven Linscott, who was convicted of rape and murder and
later released because DNA evidence eliminated him as the attacker); DNA Tests Clear
Man of Rape Nearly 8 Years After Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1995, at B5 (annou-
ncing the release of Terry Leon Chalmers because DNA tests showed that he was wrongly
convicted); Ben Dobbin, Nearly 6 Years Later, DNA Test Frees Wrongly Convicted Man,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1993, at Al (describing plight of Lennie Callace, who was convicted
of rape but later exonerated by DNA evidence); Mary Neubauer, Imprisoned Ten Years,
Man Freed by DNA Testing, PHIL. INQUIRER, Sept. 30, 1994, at A31 (reporting on release
of Frederick Daye, who was wrongly convicted of kidnap, rape, and robbery); Jonathan
Rabinovitz, Rape Conviction Overturned on DNA Tests: Reversal Comes After the Man
Had Served 11 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1992, at B6 (reporting on DNA
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Neufeld established "The Innocence Project" at the Benjamin A.
Cardozo School of Law for the sole purpose of using DNA evidence
to exonerate convicts who proclaim their innocence." Mr. Scheck
explains that most of the cases they agree to pursue have several
features in common: the defendant is convicted on the basis of
identification of witnesses, he is too poor to afford private lawyers,
and the forensic data introduced at trial were flawed or were
inadequate to establish the defendant's identity."'
Aside from cases in which defendants were completely
exonerated, almost all states confronted with the issue of whether
criminal defendants in rape trials are entitled to new trials on the
basis of newly discovered DNA evidence have opted to grant new
trials when only one perpetrator was involved. For example, in a
Pennsylvania case, Commonwealth v. Reese,"2 the defendant was
convicted of rape on the basis of the victim's identification of him as
her attacker.' After the defendant's conviction, a DNA test
excluded him as the possible source of the semen found in the victim
and as a result of this new evidence, the lower court ordered a new
trial.8 4 At the lower court hearing on whether to grant a new trial,
the Commonwealth offered to prove that the victim told the police
that her attacker complained to her that he could not ejaculate during
the assault, and that she had a live-in boyfriend with whom she had
exoneration of Kerry Kotler); Paul W. Valentine, Jailed for Murder, Freed by DNA: Md.
Waterman, Twice Convicted in Child's Death Is Released, WASH. POST, June 29, 1993, at
Al (reporting on DNA liberation of Kirk Bloodsworth, who was sentenced to death at his
first trial); see also Inmate Is Freed, 10 Years After Rape Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
1995, at A24 (reporting on the release from prison of Earl Berryman and noting that the
state would appeal the overturning of his conviction); James F. McCarty, DNA Test Lets
Prisoner Go Home, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept. 17,1994, at 1A (reporting on Brian
Piszczek, who was released after four years in prison and is waiting for prosecutors to
determine whether they have enough evidence for a new trial).
80. See Simoncini, supra note 68, at 22; Gina Kolata, DNA Tests Provide Key to Cell
Doors for Some Wrongly Convicted Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1994, at A20; Ken
Myers, Cardozo Students Learn to Use DNA Tests to Prove Innocence, NAT'L L.J., Dec.
12, 1994, at A17.
81. Kolata, supra note 80, at A20.
82. 663 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
83. Id. at 208. The victim was raped after being forced out of her car at night and was
questioned extensively about her ability to identify the defendant in the dark conditions
during the attack. Id. at 207. She also gave a description of the perpetrator's car which
could not be linked to the defendant either by ownership or use. Id. Furthermore, there
were no fibers or hair samples linking Reese to the crime and no fingerprint tests were
performed. Id. at 208.
84. Id. at 207.
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sexual relations."5 The Commonwealth argued that these factors
would offer a reasonable explanation as to why Reese was not linked
to the seminal fluid obtained from the victim after the rape, and that
the DNA evidence therefore did not necessarily exculpate Reese. 6
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania concluded that such testimony
would be proper rebuttal testimony in a new trial but was irrelevant
when considering whether to grant a new trial "because the jury did
not hear evidence of other explanations for the deposit of this seminal
fluid" during the first trial.' The court then affirmed the lower
court's decision to grant a new trial on the ground of the DNA
evidence."8
In a similar Wisconsin case, State v. Saecker,9 the defendant was
found guilty of second-degree sexual assault, burglary, and kidnapping
on the basis of several inculpatory statements made by the defendant
to other jail inmates and guards, as well as a truck driver's testimony
that he picked up the bloodstained defendant from the road in the
vicinity of and shortly after the crime.9" Neither the victim nor her
husband identified the defendant.9' Additionally, their description
of the attacker did not match the defendant in several respects.9
After being presented with new DNA evidence that the defendant
could not be the source of the semen found in the victim's underwear,
the court held that "[t]he weak identification testimony coupled with
the DNA evidence provides a reasonable probability that retrial will
produce a different result," and therefore granted a new trial. 3
In one of the first cases involving a request for a new trial on the
basis of newly discovered DNA evidence, People v. Dabbs,94 the
New York appellate court held that the evidence was sufficiently
important to warrant a new trial,95 even though more than one
perpetrator was involved.96 In Dabbs, a woman who was six months
85. d. at 209.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 209-10.
88. Id. at 210. The court's standard of review included a requirement that the new
evidence would likely compel a different result at a new trial. Id. at 209.
89. No. 94-2782, 1995 WL 507607 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1995).
90. Id. at *1.
91. IM.
92. Id. Unfortunately, the opinion does not explain how the victims' descriptions of
the defendant differed from his actual appearance. See id.
93. Id. at *1-2.
94. 587 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
95. See id. at 93; infra note 102.
96. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
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pregnant was brutally raped by one man while two others held her
downy She identified the defendant as the rapist and said she knew
him because he was a distant cousin whom she had known casually
for nine years, and was a friend of her mother's boyfriend.9" She
testified that her attacker wore a hat similar to the one she had seen
the defendant wear, and she that recognized the defendant by his
distinctive laugh and smile.99 The defendant claimed he was not the
perpetrator, but he was nevertheless convicted." ° Later DNA tests
revealed that the defendant could not have been the source of the
semen found in the victim's underwear.1"' The court concluded that
if the DNA evidence had been received at trial, the verdict probably
would have been more favorable to the defendant, so it granted the
motion to vacate'02 the conviction." The court explained, "To
have convicted defendant, the jury would either have to discount the
DNA analysis or ignore the victim's statement's of prior sexual his-
tory'o--on the present record both remote possibilities."' 5
In two other cases, state courts awarded new trials on the basis
of exculpatory DNA evidence where only one perpetrator was
involved, but under slightly different legal theories. In the first case,




100. Id at 92. The other perpetrators were never found. Id. at 91.
101. Id. at 92.
102. Id. at 93. Under New York law, a defendant can request a new trial on the basis
of newly discovered evidence only by bringing a motion to vacate judgment. See N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (1)(g) (McKinney 1983); Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 92. If a court
grants this motion, as the court did in Dabbs, the court may either vacate the judgment
and order a new trial, or modify the judgment by reducing it to one of conviction for a
lesser offense. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 440.10 (5) (McKinney 1983). In Dabbs, the court
granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss the underlying indictment in lieu of a new trial
because the victim was reluctant to participate in a retrial. 587 N.Y.S.2d 90, 93. However,
the court denied defendant's request to dismiss the indictment on the ground of legal
insufficiency. Id. at 93-94.
103. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 93. The court did not enunciate the full seven point
standard for vacatur based on newly discovered evidence, but did conclude that the new
evidence was procured with due diligence, was favorable to the defendant, and tended to
impeach the victim's identification. Id.
104. The victim testified that she had not been sexually active shortly before the rape.
See id. at 93 n.2. Cf. Yorke v. State, 556 A.2d 230, 235-36 (Md. 1989), infra notes 118-24
and accompanying text (noting fact that rape victim had sexual intercourse shortly before
rape as a crucial factor in denying defendant's motion for a new trial).
105. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 93.
106. 536 N.W.2d 487 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
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that his trial counsel was ineffective. 7 In Hicks, the defendant was
convicted of burglary, robbery, and two counts of second degree
sexual assault on the basis of the victim's identification, the defen-
dant's opportunity to commit the crime, and testimony from a state
crime lab analyst that the hair found at the scene was consistent with
the defendant's." The defendant's attorney did not request DNA
testing of hair specimens, and post-conviction testing excluded the
defendant as a possible source of pubic hairs found at the scene.0 9
Hicks moved for a new trial, contending that his attorney was
ineffective because he did not have DNA testing performed on the
hair specimens."' The trial court denied Hicks's motion for a new
trial and concluded that Hicks was not prejudiced 1  by his attor-
ney's failure to obtain DNA test results because it was not probable
that the DNA testimony would result in a different verdict. The
Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision,
reasoning that there was sufficient evidence that, if the defense
attorney had ordered DNA analysis, the result would have been
different."
In the second case, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the
exclusion of exculpatory DNA evidence as a discovery sanction was
too severe."4 In State v. Passino, the defendant was charged with
felony murder in the perpetration of sexual assault, but he was
107. Id. at 489-90.
108. Id. at 488, 492. The victim was a white woman, and her attacker was black. Id.
at 489. One head hair and four pubic hairs from a black person were found at the scene
of the crime. Id. Hicks is black. See id.
109. Id. at 489-90. The defendant was not the source of two of four pubic hairs; the
other two hairs did not contain enough DNA for analysis. IME
110. Id.
111. In order to prevail on his claim for denial of effective assistance of counsel, Hicks
had to show that his attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Id. at 490.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 492. The trial court was persuaded by the fact that the victim, who was
white, testified that no black man had ever been in her apartment, and that the only black
woman to ever be in the apartment was there two years before the rape. Id. This was
important to illustrate that the Negro hair found was probably that of the true perpetrator.
See supra note 108.
114. State v. Passino, 640 A.2d 547, 552 (Vt. 1994). In addition to the exculpatory
DNA evidence, there was also DNA evidence that incriminated the defendant. Id. at 548-
49. Both the State's and the defense's DNA evidence were excluded. Id. The defense's
evidence was excluded as a discovery sanction, while the State's evidence was suppressed
because the FBI's probability calculations were flawed. Id. A statistical flaw can be
devastating to positive DNA evidence because probability estimates are an integral part
of such evidence. See supra note 7.
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convicted of involuntary manslaughter." 5 The excluded DNA
evidence showed that two of four bloodstains found on the defen-
dant's pants did not match the blood of the victim; the other two were
inconclusive." 6 When granting the new trial the court stated,
"Presenting the exculpatory DNA profiling results to the jury ...
would have promoted the fair and efficient administration of justice
and advanced the truth-determining function of the trial process."" 7
The only reported appellate case to date in which a woman was
raped by one man and new exculpatory DNA evidence did not entitle
the defendant to a new trial is Yorke v. State."8  In Yorke, the
defendant was convicted of rape and kidnapping after the victim
identified him as the attacker."9 After Yorke's conviction, DNA
analysis revealed that Yorke's DNA pattern did not match the pattern
found in the "vaginal washings" of the victim taken shortly after the
rape.' ° The lower court denied Yorke's motion for a new trial
because Yorke could have been the rapist and still not deposited
semen; the victim testified at trial that she had sex with her boyfriend
several hours before the rape and that she did not know whether the
rapist ejaculated.' The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed,
reasoning there was no substantial possibility that a jury would have
reached a different result with this new evidence."z The court also
acknowledged in a footnote that tests subsequent to oral argument
divulged that the victim was the sole source of the fluids recovered
115. ld. at 548. He claimed he had consensual sex with the victim, and her husband
killed her in a jealous rage. Id. at 549. Apparently, the jury disagreed with this version
of events. See id. at 548.
116. Id. at 548.
117. ld. at 552. In Vermont, the appellate court review of discovery sanctions imposed
by a lower court is limited to an abuse of discretion. Id at 550. In Passino, the court held
that excluding the exculpatory DNA evidence was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 552.
118. 556 A.2d 230 (Md. 1989).
119. Id at 231,235 n.6. After visiting her boyfriend, the victim hitchhiked and accepted
a ride from a man who subsequently raped her. Id at 235 n.6. Yorke was convicted on
the basis of her identification and "other evidence tending to show that he was the
assailant." Id Unfortunately, the opinion does not describe this "other evidence."
120. Id at 232-33.
121. Id. at 235.
122. Id at 236.
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after the rape," leaving Yorke in the same position as if no DNA
tests had been performed. 24
In two other significant cases, courts used the test for a new
trial" 5 to conclude that a criminal defendant was not allowed to
have post-conviction DNA tests performed. First, in Mebane v.
Kansas," a woman had sex with her boyfriend, and shortly
thereafter, a man fell through the apartment's front door. 2 The
boyfriend noticed three men standing outside the door, including
Mebane, and the men apologized for the disruption and left."
About half an hour later, the same four men kicked in the door,
ordered the boyfriend to lie on the floor with his head covered by a
blanket, held him there at gunpoint, and brutally raped the
woman. 29 She was not sure if she was attacked by three or four
men and could not identify any of them, but the boyfriend identified
the voices of Mebane and the others. 3 The court stated that cases
which allow post-conviction DNA testing'3 ' have two similarities:
each case involved a single perpetrator, "which would make DNA
testing determinative of the guilt or innocence of the defendant," and
the State's evidence was weak. The court concluded that these
traits were missing here because there were multiple semen donors,
making any DNA tests inconclusive, and the trial court had recently
indicated that the evidence against Mebane was "overwhelming.)1 33
123. Id. at 236 n.7. This evidence suggests that no semen was recovered from the
victim and the earlier statement of the lower court judge referring to the "vaginal
washings" as "semen" was incorrect. See id. at 235. The footnote does not explain why
the victim had intercourse with one person, was raped by another, and no semen was
recovered. Id. at 236 n.7. The footnote also does not explain why the lower court was
under the impression that semen was in fact recovered. Id.
124. 1&
125. Both courts focused on the requirement that the newly discovered evidence would
probably result in a different verdict in a new trial. See infra text accompanying notes 133,
138. For the complete test for a new trial, see supra text accompanying note 60.
126. 902 P.2d 494 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).




131. The court decided to approach Mebane's request for DNA testing in the same way
it would approach a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Id. at
497. The court stated that it did not matter whether the issue was viewed as an
exculpatory evidence issue or as a newly discovered evidence issue. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 497-98. The opinion does not give specific facts detailing the trial court's
conclusion that the evidence against Mebane was "overwhelming." See id. The only
inculpatory evidence mentioned in the opinion was the boyfriend's identification of
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Second, in a Florida murder case," the defendant was con-
victed of two first degree murders and two second degree mur-
ders.135  The defendant claimed that the people were murdered in
the course of a robbery in his furniture store.3 6 After his convic-
tion, the defendant requested a court-appointed expert to perform
DNA tests on the bloodstain evidence, believing that the DNA tests
would corroborate his theory of events by showing the position of
bloodstains from each victim. 7 The court denied the request and
ruled that possible new results from a DNA test would not change the
outcome of the case.' The court emphasized that at trial the
defendant had admitted he was at the scene of the crime, and there
was no dispute that his blood, as well as the blood of the four victims,
was present. 39 Furthermore, in order to believe his story, the court
stated that a jury would have to disbelieve at least three witnes-
ses.140In State v. Hunt, the North Carolina Supreme Court had its first
confrontation with exculpatory DNA evidence, and the text of the
majority opinion sends a very strong message: New trials based on
newly discovered DNA evidence are disfavored. Indeed, they are so
disfavored that Justice Meyer, writing for the majority, did not feel
the issue was worthy of analysis. 4' Instead, the court simply
adopted the superior court judge's ruling, without even stating the
basis for his decision.42  This approach is consistent with the
Mebane as a perpetrator; co-conspirators statements identifying Mebane were later
recanted. Id. at 494, 497-98.
134. Ziegler v. State, 654 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1995).
135. Id. at 1163.
136. Ziegler v. State, 402 So. 2d 365,368 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982).
137. Ziegler, 654 So. 2d at 1163.
138. Id. at 1164. The court also concluded that this request was time-barred, but
assumed arguendo that even if it were not, a new result would probably not be reached
in a new trial. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Hunt, 339 N.C. at 660-61, 457 S.E.2d at 298-99.
142. The opinion states, "We have carefully reviewed the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the extensive order entered by Judge Morgan dated 12 August 1994,
and the findings of fact and conclusions of law of his subsequent order dated 10 November
1994, and we hereby adopt the same as our own." Id. at 661,457 S.E.2d at 299. Similarly,
although the dissent acknowledged that DNA evidence was an issue, it failed to delve into
Judge Morgan's analysis. See id. at 662, 457 S.E.2d at 299 (Frye, J., dissenting). The
dissenters disagreed with Judge Morgan's conclusion, but did not analyze his reasoning.
See id (Frye, J., dissenting).
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reluctance of trial judges to grant new trials,4 3 and with the
deference that appellate courts give to a trial court's discretion.'"
Nevertheless, in terms of the bare text of the opinion, the
majority went against the short history of cases involving DNA
evidence in North Carolina. To date, the fact-finder in reported cases
by the North Carolina Supreme Court or Court of Appeals involving
DNA has never drawn a conclusion that is contrary to the DNA
evidence." In other words, where DNA evidence has shown that
the semen found in a rape victim was consistent with that of the
defendant, the jury has found the defendant guilty of rape.'46 Con-
sidering the persuasive power of DNA evidence with both juries and
judges,'47 the holding in Hunt is suspicious because it summarily
concludes that exculpatory DNA evidence would not lead to a
different result.' 48
143. See supra note 65. "The applicant in all cases, civil as well as criminal, has the
laboring oar to rebut the presumption that the verdict is correct and that he has not
exercised due diligence in preparing for trial." State v. Casey, 201 N.C. 620, 624, 161 S.E.
81, 83 (1931). But see Survey, Developments in the Law: Confronting the New Challenge
of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1577-78 (1995) (arguing that the rationale
for statutory time limits on motions for newly discovered evidence does not apply to
exculpatory DNA evidence) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
144. See supra note 64.
145. For example, in Brooks v. Hayes, 113 N.C. App. 168, 438 S.E.2d 420 (1993) disc.
rev. denied, 335 N.C. 766, 442 S.E.2d 508-09 (1994), the court held that a man was not
entitled to a directed verdict that he was not the father of a child because DNA tests
indicated a high probability that he was, even though the man had a vasectomy prior to
the time the child was conceived. Id. at 169-72, 438 S.E.2d at 420-22.
146. See supra note 70.
147. In Batcheldor v. Boyd, the North Carolina Court of Appeals went so far as to hold
that it was not error to allow a corpse to be exhumed to perform DNA testing so that an
intestate taker could be determined. 108 N.C. App. 275, 281, 423 S.E.2d. 810, 814 (1992),
disc rev. denied, 333 N.C. 254, 422 S.E.2d 700 (1993).
148. North Carolina fact-finders ordinarily do not have the opportunity to acquit a
defendant on the basis of DNA evidence, because when law enforcement officials perform
DNA tests and the results are exculpatory, officials usually do not prosecute that suspect.
See Todd Nelson, Teen Cleared in Rape, Assault, Criticizes Police, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), Oct. 4, 1995, at B5 (reporting that charges against a man arrested for rape were
dismissed after DNA test and fingerprint comparisons eliminated him as a suspect). For
example, the FBI reports that in more than 37% of its sexual assault cases, the primary
suspect is excluded through DNA testing. Neufeld, supra note 7, at 198-99.
Hunt also deviates from the approach used by other states in its summary
disposition-other state appellate courts have dedicated entire opinions to the issue. See
supra notes 82-140 and accompanying text. Also, a New York court recently held that
DNA evidence alone was sufficient to inculpate a defendant and support a guilty verdict.
State v. Rush, 630 N.Y.S.2d. 631, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). In Rush, the only evidence
against the defendant was: the complainant was robbed and raped, swabs taken from her
vagina shortly after the rape contained semen, the semen samples matched the DNA
profile of the defendant (the odds were one in 500 million that another person was the
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Judge Morgan's order, as incorporated in the majority opinion,
uses the approach adopted by other states. He recognizes that new
DNA evidence does not automatically warrant either a dismissal of
the charges'49 or a new trial.5 Instead, the new evidence must
meet the seven-point test for a new trial.'5 ' As other jurisdictions
have concluded, Judge Morgan held that DNA evidence is com-
petent, material, relevant, probably true, and that due diligence
was used to procure the testimony at trial. 3 As other courts have
done, he delved into a factual analysis to determine if the new
evidence would affect the outcome of the case.Y54
In at least one respect, Judge Morgan's analysis was unusual. He
concluded that the absence of Hunt's semen did not show that he did
not rape the victim because Hunt could have penetrated her without
depositing semen. 5  Although the same possibility was raised in
Yorkel56 and Reese,'57 those cases had some factual basis for the
theory."' In Hunt, no such basis existed to support the judge's
speculation.' 9 The theory that Deborah Sykes's rapist did not
source of the DNA), the complainant had not had sexual intercourse with anyone else in
the recent past, and the defendant was seen in the area of the rape three days before the
crime. Id. at 632.
149. But see supra note 79 (listing instances where exclusionary DNA evidence
ultimately led to the release of prisoners).
150. See State v. Hunt, No. 84CRS42263, jud. order at 10 (Super. Ct. Forsyth County,
Nov. 10, 1994).
151. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
152. But see Cerisse Anderson, Convictions Upheld Despite DNA Results: Judge
Questions Quality of Test Samples, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 16,1995, at 1 (reporting on a New York
judge's ruling that defendants failed to show that the specific procedures used to preserve
forensic samples for DNA testing were trustworthy).
153. See Hunt, No. 84CR842263, jud. order at 5-7 (Super. Ct. Forsyth County, Nov. 10,
1994).
154. See id. at 5-10.
155. See id. at 4, 5, 8. Judge Morgan was consistent in his position. Before the DNA
results were known he stated: "Of course, if the defendant did not have sex with the
victim but he otherwise aided the perpetrator or perpetrators, or if the defendant
penetrated the victim but there were no secretions from the defendant, then a DNA test
would not be dispositive of the defendant's guilt or innocence." State v. Hunt, No.
84CRS42263, jud. order at 167 (Super. Ct. Forsyth County, Aug. 12, 1994).
156. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
158. In Yorke, the victim testified at trial that she did not know whether the rapist
ejaculated. Yorke v. State 556 A.2d 230, 235 (Md. 1989). In Reese, the victim told the
police her attacker complained to her that he could not ejaculate. Commonwealth v.
Reese, 663 A.2d 206, 209 (Pa. Super. 1995).
159. The Pennsylvania court disapproved of this approach in Commonwealth v. Reese.
663 A.2d at 209-10. There the court explained:
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ejaculate is particularly unlikely since there was no dispute that the
victim was raped, there was semen in her vagina,' 6° and the semen
was not her husband's. 161 Indeed, taking Judge Morgan's approach
to the extreme, DNA evidence would never exculpate a defendant
such as Ronald Cotton, because there would always be a possibility
that the convicted man raped the victim, but simply failed to secrete
fluid.
Considered together with Judge Morgan's ruling, the Hunt
decision is also significant because it involves exculpatory DNA
evidence in a factual situation in which there is evidence to support
a theory that there was more than one perpetrator. In most of the
cases where courts have granted new trials, there has only been one
perpetrator, so the issues of acting in concert and aiding and abetting
have not been raised. 62 Yet, in People v. Dabbs, the victim was
held down by two men and raped by a third." She not only
identified the defendant as the rapist, but identified him as someone
she knew. T' Nevertheless, the court, in vacating the defendant's
conviction based on DNA evidence," did not suggest that the
defendant could have been one of the men holding her down, nor
that as an aider and abettor he did not deserve a new trial.'67
Because the jury did not hear evidence of other explanations for the deposit of
this seminal fluid, it would have been improper for the [lower court] to have
considered it when examining whether the DNA evidence was exculpatory and
whether it would likely have resulted in a different verdict if admitted to trial.
Id at 210.
160. See Hunt, 339 N.C. at 631, 457 S.E2d at 281.
161. See State v. Hunt, No. 84CRS42263, jud. order at 4 (Super. Ct. Forsyth County,
Nov. 10, 1994).
162. "It is well settled that 'when a conspiracy is formed to commit a robbery or
burglary, and a murder is committed by any one of the conspirators in the attempted
perpetration of the crime, each and all of the conspirators are guilty of murder in the first
degree." State v. Carey, 288 N.C. 254, 273, 218 S.E.2d 387, 399 (1975) (quoting State v.
Fox, 277 N.C. 1, 17, 175 S.E.2d 561, 571 (1970)), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 904
(1976).
163. 587 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). See supra notes 94-105 and accom-
panying text.
164. Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
165. See supra note 102 (explaining the motion to vacate a judgment under New York
law).
166. The court might easily have concluded that the victim was correct that the
defendant was present, especially since she knew him, but that in the stressful situation of
the rape, she was confused as to who held her down and who actually raped her.
167. The opinion does not indicate why the court may have overlooked the aider and
abetter theory. Perhaps the prosecution did not raise this theory because the other men
were never found. See Dabbs, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 91. Alternatively, the court may have
believed that the victim was completely mistaken-that the defendant was not the rapist
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However, in Mebane v. Kansas, the defendant was one of four men
who allegedly forced himself into the victim's apartment and raped
her." In that case, the court concluded that DNA evidence would
not lead to a different result because the large number of semen
donors would make DNA analysis inconclusive. 69 It did not go the
extra step and conclude that, even if the defendant was positively
excluded as the source of semen found in the victim, he would still be
guilty on the grounds that he was in a conspiracy with the others, or
that he aided and abetted them. Therefore, Hunt is groundbreaking
in its implication that defendants who may be guilty of aiding and
abetting a rape, or other crimes surrounding a rape, will not neces-
sarily be saved by exculpatory DNA evidence.
Hunt also addresses another new DNA issue: To what extent
will exculpatory DNA evidence affect a charge of felony murder when-
a murder is carried out in the course of several felonies, 70 only one
of which is rape? Judge Morgan's answer is that the evidence would
not affect the outcome of the case.' The only other appellate
decision to deal with exculpatory DNA evidence in a felony-murder
case 72 is State v. Passino.'73 This case was quite different from the
situation in Hunt, however, because the defendant in Passino admitted
that he had sex with the victim, and the exculpatory DNA evidence
and he was not one of the men who held her down.
168. 902 P.2d 494, 495 (Kan. 1995). See supra notes 126-33, and accompanying text.
169. Mebane, 902 P.2d at 497-98.
170. In the words of the North Carolina Supreme Court:
An interrelationship between the felony and the homicide is a prerequisite to the
application of the felony murder doctrine. A killing is committed.. . within the
purview of a felony-murder statute when there is no break in the chain of events
leading from the initial felony to the act causing death, so that the homicide is
linked to or a part of the series of incidents forming one continuous transaction.
State v. Bush, 289 N.C. 159, 173, 221 S.E.2d 333, 341-42, (citing State v. Thompson, 280
N.C. 202, 212, 185 S.E.2d 666, 673 (1972)), death sentence vacated, 429 U.S. 809 (1976).
171. See State v. Hunt, No. 84CRS42263, jud. order (Super. Ct. Forsyth County, Nov.
10, 1994). Judge Morgan stated that the exculpatory DNA evidence was not conclusive
evidence of Hunt's innocence because the jury found Hunt guilty of felony murder on the
basis of murder that occurred during the perpetration of four separate crimes. Id. at 5.
He further explained that the new evidence did not bear on the kidnapping or robbery
aspects of the crime. Id. at 10. Therefore, Judge Morgan concluded that the State's case
was still strong and a new result was not probable. Id.
172. In one non-appellate case, Kirk Bloodsworth was found guilty of the rape and
murder of a nine-year-old girl. Valentine, supra note 79, at Al. He was imprisoned for
almost nine years until a DNA test showed that he was not the source of the genetic
material found in the girl's underwear. Id. He was released, but there was no evidence
that there had been more than one perpetrator, and rape was the only underlying felony.
Id at Al, A12.
173. 640 A.2d 547 (Vt. 1994).
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was bloodstains, not semen.74 Also, in the murder case of Zeigler
v. State,'" the defendant admitted that he was present, and rape was
not one of the crimes.' 76 Therefore, Hunt also appears to set the
precedent that when a murder is committed in the perpetration of
several felonies," conclusive evidence that the defendant did not
perform one of the felons will be insufficient to warrant a new trial.
Unfortunately, Judge Morgan did not appear to consider that the
DNA evidence could be exculpatory for each of the underlying
felonies, because if Hunt was not the rapist, the possibility exists that
he was not there at all.'78 Similarly, the exculpatory DNA evidence
could undercut the theory that Hunt was present and acted in concert
with or aided and abetted someone else.179  Morgan failed to
acknowledge, as the dissent implicitly did, that Hunt's implication may
simply be a case of mistaken identity-eyewitness testimony is
notoriously faulty.'" The facts in Hunt would have given Judge
174. See id. at 548-49.
175. 654 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1995).
176. Id. at 1164.
177. The jury completed a general verdict form accompanied by answers to
interrogatories. See State v. Hunt, No. 84CRS42263, jud. order at app. (Super. Ct. Forsyth
County, Aug. 12, 1994). This form indicated that the jury found the defendant guilty of
kidnapping and robbery with a dangerous weapon as well as rape and sexual offense. Id.
However, the jury did not have an interrogatory addressing acting in concert or aiding and
abetting. Id.
178. Some of the most damning evidence against Hunt was the testimony of Johnny
Gray, who said he saw Hunt hitting a partially naked woman as he straddled her and then
running away while tucking in his shirt. Hunt, 339 N.C. at 634, 457 S.E.2d at 283. If this
is what Gray actually observed, and the semen found in the victim could not have come
from Darryl Hunt, a person could logically conclude that Gray identified the wrong man.
179. In a California case, Frederick Daye was convicted on the theory that he acted
together with David Pringle to abduct, rape, and rob a woman. State v. Daye, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 569, 573-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). He was convicted on the basis of two iden-
tifications, including the victim's, despite the five alibi witnesses who testified on his behalf.
Simoncini, supra note 69, at 23-24. Although he was accused of acting in concert with
another, he was released on the basis of mistaken identification when DNA tests showed
that he was not the source of semen found in the victim. See Neubauer, supra note 79, at
A31. The facts were much more clear-cut than the facts in Hunt because, unlike in Hunt,
the victim lived to tell her version.
180. As one commentator maintains:
A woman who innocently misidentifies someone as her rapist is not lying-she
is just mistaken. All too often the witness's sincerity and certainty induces the
jury to convict even the falsely accused. Wrongful convictions resulting from
faulty eyewitness identification are, unfortunately, an old story.... Forensic
DNA testing, however, adds a new dimension to our understanding of this
problem. It is apparently much worse than most people dared to believe.
Neufeld, supra note 7, at 200; see also Margaret B. Korera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of
Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703, 719-22 (1992) (concluding from
study that juries inherently rely on eyewitness testimony more than they rely on hearsay
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Morgan ammunition to rebut this argument, but the fact that he failed
to mention it at all is problematic.
18
'
It is also regrettable that Judge Morgan tried to draw a distinct
line between the acting-in-concert and felony-murder theories.
Morgan first concluded that there was evidence that Hunt alone was
the murderer, but this simply is not supported by the facts. If
Deborah Sykes was kidnapped, robbed, and raped by one person, and
Hunt was not the rapist, then Hunt was not the killer."s Further-
more, it seems unlikely that Hunt acted alone and murdered Deborah
Sykes in the course of robbing or kidnapping her, but that she was
raped by some unknown person postmortem. Therefore, in light of
the DNA evidence excluding Hunt as the rapist, the only true basis
on which he could still be guilty of this crime is if he either acted in
concert or aided and abetted someone else. By suggesting differently,
Judge Morgan's and the majority's positions are less compelling.1"'
The most disappointing aspect of the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision in State v. Hunt is the lost opportunity it represents.
Due to the controversy surrounding inculpatory DNA evidence,
exculpatory DNA evidence has been taken for granted." No
testimony, but unlike hearsay witnesses, where juries are inherently skeptical and can
differentiate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses, subjects cannot distinguish
between good and poor eyewitnesses); Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory
Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Thx. L. REV. 1041, 1072 n.123 (1995) (listing
instances of defendants who were wrongfully convicted on the basis of eyewitness
testimony); Kerni L. Pickel, Evaluation and Integration of Eyewitness Reports, 17 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 569,569 (1993) ("Many studies have shown that witnesses can be inaccurate
and suggestible.").
181. Four witnesses placed Darryl Hunt in the general vicinity of the crime at the
approximate time when Deborah Sykes was murdered, see supra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text, and two others described suspicious behavior by Hunt shortly after the
murders occurred, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. Although no witness's
testimony is airtight, there is strength in numbers.
182. To support a theory that Hunt alone was the killer, he must have raped her
without ejaculating, and Deborah Sykes must have had sex shortly before her death with
someone besides her husband. Although possible, this is not probable because the
morning of her death, Sykes left her home where she resided with her husband at 5:30
a.m., drove the hour it took her to get to work, and was killed near her workplace between
6:00 and 7:00 a.m. See Hunt, 339 N.C. at 628-31, 457 S.E.2d at 279-81.
183. For instance, in State v. Saecker, No. 94-2782, 1995 WL 507607 (Wis. Ct. App.
Aug. 8, 1995), the fact that the defendant was charged with several crimes in addition to
rape did not make the State's case against him any stronger in the face of new exculpatory
DNA evidence. See id.
184. As two authors have noted, "[T]he most likely situation where DNA testing should
be outcome-determinative is where such evidence exculpates a criminal defendant because
a criminal defendant need only raise 'reasonable doubt' about guilt to escape conviction."
David A. Gass & Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Addendum: An Analysis of Decisional Law
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courts or commentators have even considered the use of exclusionary
DNA evidence in a controversial fact situation involving aiding and
abetting and felony murder as presented in Hunt. Instead of rising to
the challenge of creating a well-reasoned, important precedent,'1
8
the North Carolina Supreme Court summarily approved Judge
Morgan's decision and passed the buck to a future court. However,
due to the large number of people who were convicted before DNA
evidence was admissible in criminal courts, the North Carolina
appellate courts are certain to confront this issue again. 6
The other problem raised by State v. Hunt is the question of who
should decide hotly contested factual issues-a judge or a jury? In its
opinion, the majority devoted nine pages to a description of the
facts,'" which should have been unnecessary if there were no factual
disputes. Given the important history in this country of juries as the
finders of fact in criminal law, '88 it may have been more prudent to
let a jury hear the new evidence and decide the felony murder and
the aiding and abetting issues. Furthermore, juries may be more
adept than judges at deciding issues of fact because the consensus of
a diverse group requires more deliberation than the act of a single
judge."9 Moreover, most people would rather have a jury of their
peers decide their fate than a single judge.9 In State v. Nickerson,
Governing the Use of DNA Evidence, in DNA ON TRIAL: GENETIC IDENTIFICATION AND
CRIMINAL JuSTICE 43, 56 (Paul R. Billings ed., 1992).
185. "The use of DNA testing by the defense for exculpatory purposes is relatively
unexplored in the legal literature." DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, supra note 143, at 1557
n2.
186. Indeed, new DNA issues are on the horizon because some men who were
wrongfully convicted or detained before DNA evidence exculpated them have instigated
civil lawsuits. See, e.g., Brison v. Tester, No. 94-2256, 1995 WL 517603, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 1995); Roberts v. Toal, No. CIV A. 94-608, 1995 WL 51678, *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8,
1995); Snyder v. Alexandria, 870 F.Supp. 672 (E.D. Va. 1994).
187. See Hunt, 339 N.C. 622 at 628-36, 457 S.E.2d at 279-84.
188. See, e.g., Anne B. Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's Different Voice,
62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1377, 1386 (1994) (addressing the important role of the jury as fact-
finder in criminal law).
189. Id. at 1386-89.
190. This preference can be seen in the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which guarantees the right to an impartial jury trial in criminal prosecutions.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. When it held that a jury trial is a fundamental right which
should apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme
Court explained:
The framers of the [state] constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary
but insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action. Providing an
accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferred the common-sense
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the North Carolina Supreme Court explained the simple rationale and
purpose for new trials: "A motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence is for the purpose of putting new evidence before
a jury."'' In State v. Hunt, Darryl Hunt presented new evidence.
It should have been put before a jury.
ELIZABETH V. LAFOLLETTE
judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of
a single judge, he was to have it.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
191. State v. Nickerson, 320 N.C. 603, 609, 359 S.E.2d 760, 763 (1987).
1996] 1319

